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Bank-Owned Life Insurance: Much More than Just "Janitors

Insurance"

I. INTRODUCTION

How much should the death of a rank-and-file employee
financially reward an employer? Although the answer to that
question may depend on various factors, many feel that the answer
should be: not at all.'

Nonetheless, many employers have

benefited from the deaths of a broad base of their employees since
the 1980s through the use of insurance referred to as "corporateowned life insurance" (COLI) or, when purchased by banks (a
common use), "bank-owned life insurance" (BOLI).' Banks such

as Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wachovia all expect
to benefit when particular employees die, even though, in most
cases, the employees' heirs will not receive any direct benefit
under the BOLI policies the banks have procured.'

BOLI is a controversial topic, and to the layperson, it may
seem as though banks are profiting from the deaths of employees
merely to bolster their bottom lines, as suggested by recent press
stories.4 In reality, however, most banks actually tie the gains
(formally or informally) they receive when their employees die to
the funding of pre- and post-retirement benefit obligations owed

1. See Ellen E. Schultz & Theo Francis, Valued Employees: Worker Dies, Firm
Profits - Why?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Valued Employees];
Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Many Banks Boost Earnings with 'Janitors' Life
Insurance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Many Banks]; Theo Francis
& Ellen E. Schultz, Big Banks Quietly Pile Up 'Janitors'Insurance,WALL ST. J., May
2, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Big Banks].
2. Valued Employees, supra note 1. While "broad-based" COLI came into
existence only in the last few decades, other business uses of life insurance, such as
coverage on "key persons" to the business' success or on business owners to facilitate
ownership succession in the event of death, have much longer histories. Telephone
Interview with Richard Mann, Principal Member, Mann, Conroy, Eisenberg &
Assoc., LLC., in Greensboro, N.C. (Sept. 23, 2006).
3. See Big Banks, supra note 1.
4. Valued Employees, supra note 1; Many Banks, supra note 1; Big Banks, supra
note 1.
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to their employees. Even so, some banks' and other companies'
abuse of this particular financial tool has caused public outcry,
litigation, and legislation.6 Despite the controversy surrounding
BOLl, banks should continue to use it cautiously in order to take
advantage of the myriad of benefits that it offers as a legitimate
investment.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the mechanics of BOLI
and why banks have invested in it so heavily.8 Part III examines
the controversy surrounding BOLI, including unfavorable press
reports along with litigation concerning a once-popular but now
defunct version of COLI called "leveraged" COLI, and the
administrative guidance that has governed bank purchases of
BOLL. 9 Part IV discusses the recent enactment of the Pension
Protection Act of 200610 and how it affects BOLL.1' Finally, Part V
analyzes BOLI in the current atmosphere and concludes that in
many cases it continues to be a sound and appropriate investment
for banks.12
II.

THE MECHANICS AND USES OF BOLI

Banks have used BOLI to take advantage of life insurance
contracts as tax-favorable investments since the late 1980s."
Before describing why and how banks have invested in BOLl, it is

5. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT
ON THE PURCHASE AND RISK MANAGEMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE, OCC BULL. No.

2004-56, at 2 (Dec. 7, 2004) [hereinafter OCC 2004-56] (noting that banks have the
authority under 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh) to hold life insurance in order to fund preand post-retirement employee benefits); John T. Adney et al., COLI Reconsidered, J.
FIN. SERVICE PROF., Nov. 2002, at 41.
6. See, e.g., Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 863, 120 Stat.
780, 1021-24 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 101(j), 60391) (LEXIS through 2006 Sess.);
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006); Valued Employees,
supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 2 (describing legitimate uses of
BOLI).
8. See infra notes 13-76 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 77-120 and accompanying text.
10. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 863.
11. See infra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
13. Valued Employees, supra note 1.
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appropriate to describe the investment characteristics of life
insurance in general.
A.

Investing in Life Insurance

Generally, death benefits from a life insurance contract are
tax-exempt to the beneficiaries of the contract.1 4 Life insurance
contracts typically involve (1) an insurer - the life insurance
company that issues the contract, (2) a policyholder - the party
that owns the contract, (3) the insured - the person whose life is
insured by the contract, and (4) one or more beneficiaries - those
parties that will receive proceeds from the insurer when the
insured dies." There are several forms of life insurance, including
term life insurance and permanent life insurance. 16 This Note
deals with permanent life insurance, as it is the type of life
insurance that BOLI plans utilize. 7
Typically, with permanent life insurance, policyholders pay
level premiums every year in order for the insured to remain
covered.' 8 These premiums fund the contracted amount of death
benefits that the beneficiaries will receive.' 9 They are determined
by actuaries based on, among other factors, life expectancy, carrier
profits, and carrier expenses. ° Once insurers receive premiums
from policyholders, they invest them in order to increase the cash

14. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2006).
15. See generally JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 173.05 (2d ed. 2006) (describing several varieties of life insurance).
16. Id. Term insurance involves an insured whose life is only insured for an
agreed-upon duration of time. Id. at § 173.05(A). With this type of insurance, once
the insured survives past the agreed-upon date, his or her life is no longer insured.
Id.
17. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 23; Telephone Interview with Richard Mann,
supra note 2. This is perhaps a simplification for the ease of the reader. In reality,
BOLl plans usually utilize universal life insurance or, in some cases, whole life
insurance, which are particular types of permanent life insurance. OCC 2004-56,
supra note 5, at 22. In general, permanent life insurance is intended to provide
coverage for the entire life of the person insured, whereas term life insurance, as the
name suggests, provides coverage only for a defined term. Id.
18. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, at § 173.05(C)(1).
19. Id.
20. Financial Web, How Your Insurance Premiums Are Calculated,
http://www.finweb.com/insurance/how-your-insurance-premiums-are-calculated.htmi
(last visited Nov. 28, 2006); Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
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values of the policies, with the expectation that, with continued
premium payments and interest accrual, the cash values will be
adequate to cover the agreed upon death benefits when the
insureds are expected to die.21 Such an increase in a policy's cash
value is the life insurance contract's inside "build-up., 22 This
build-up is not currently taxable to beneficiaries or policyholders,
as it will only later pay the death benefits when the insureds die.23
The concept of the cash value of insurance policies is very
important and can be described as an actuarially-determined
combination of (1) premiums paid into the contract, (2) compound
interest gained every year on those premiums, and (3) the value of
the remaining coverage to the insured, with the insurers' costs of
providing such coverage being subtracted out each year. 24 In
understanding the attractiveness of BOLl as an investment, the
important consideration is not exactly how the cash value
accumulates, but rather that it accumulates on a tax-deferred basis
25
and ultimately passes tax-free when paid out as death benefits.
As indicated above, banks and other corporations invest in
BOLl and COLI primarily to fund pre- and post-retirement
benefits owed to their employees. 26 "These benefits typically
include 'welfare' benefits such as the payment or coverage of
retiree health care expenses."27 A discussion of the events leading
up to the creation of BOLl helps demonstrate the product's
usefulness.

21. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, at § 173.05(C); Telephone Interview with Richard
Mann, supra note 2.
22. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, at § 173.05(H)(1).
23. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 110 (14th ed. 2006).
While the inside build-up is not taxable if it remains in the policy until death proceeds
are paid out, if a life insurance policy is surrendered before the insured dies, any
amount received over and above the investment (premiums) in the policy are taxable
when the policy is surrendered. Id. at 114.
24. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, at § 173.05(C)(3)(a). Cost of Insurance (COI) can
include administrative costs as well as profit for the insurance company. KLEIN ET
AL., supra note 23, at 110. The COI element of life insurance became very important
to banks in determining how to structure their BOLI plans. See Telephone Interview
with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
25. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
26. See OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 1; Adney et al., supra note 5, at 44.
27. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 41.
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Developments Leading to the Creation of BOLI

Entrepreneurs created BOLI largely as a result of two
developments in the 1980s that affected the attractiveness of
municipal bonds as investments and how banks were to account
for certain expenses. 28 The first development was the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA),29 which, among other things, altered the

federal income tax treatment of bank investments in municipal
bonds. 30 Municipal bonds have tax-exempt returns that encourage
investment in them.3' Although municipal bonds typically have
low before-tax returns, their after-tax returns are sometimes
comparable with the after-tax returns of other taxable bonds.32 At
the same time, municipal bonds are generally much safer
investments than taxable corporate bonds. 33 Before TRA, banks
were able to take out loans that indirectly funded the purchase of
municipal bonds and deduct the interest payments on those loans.34
Banks, which, due to regulatory requirements generally, can invest
only in high quality "bank eligible" securities, took advantage of
the financial benefits of such investments and thus became the
largest investor in municipal bonds by the 1980s. 3' This changed,
however, when Congress passed TRA, which "placed a severe
limit on the amount banks could deduct - eighty percent of the
costs of purchasing and carrying bonds of issuers that do not issue
more than $10 million of bonds annually., 36 After TRA, municipal

28. Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
29. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
30. See Hearing on the Use of Tax-Preferred Bond Financing:Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th
Cong. 37 (2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Carla Sledge, President,
Government Finance Officers Association and Chief Financial Officer, Wayne
County, Mich.).
31. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006).
32. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 23, at 185.
33. Id.
34. Hearing, supra note 30, at 38.
35. See id.
36. Id. A similar arbitrage issue was later presented by "leveraged" COLI plans,
which was the subject of litigation discussed later in this Note. See notes 97-103 and
accompanying text.
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bonds were no longer as attractive as investments and banks
willingly considered other financing alternatives."
The second blow to banks, as well as all publicly held
companies, came with the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
Statement Number 106 (FAS 106) issued in December of 1990.38
FAS 106 required employers to currently account for future postretirement liabilities they would later owe to their employees.39
Thus, banks had to determine such future liabilities, discount them
to present value with an appropriate interest rate, and account for
them over time on their books as current expenses. 4° This new
accounting requirement greatly reduced banks' earnings, which
made them look relatively worse to stockholders. 41
This
development left banks with a desire to consider arrangements
that would increase earnings
in order to help offset the new
42
requirement.
accounting
BOLI arose as a response to the combination of these two
occurrences, which seemed to fill both the tax-favorable
investment gap as well as the need to increase earnings
immediately.43 BOLI permitted tax-deferred returns to build-up in
the policy and provided a mechanism with which banks could help
offset their post-retirement benefits expenses without4 suffering an
immediate expense and reduction of current earnings.
C.

The Mechanics of BOLI

BOLI is composed of life insurance contracts covering the
lives of banks' employees - sometimes many thousands of

37. John Kihn, The FinancialPerformanceof Low-Grade Municipal Bond Funds,
FIN. MGMT. ASS'N, Summer 1996, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mim4130/

isn2_v25/ai_18913545/pg_15; Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
38. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 106, EMPLOYERS'
ACCOUNTING FOR POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., Dec. 1990.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

OTHER

THAN

Id. at 5.
See id.
Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
Id.
See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.

PENSIONS,

FIN.
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employees45 - in which the banks are the sole beneficiaries.46 Thus,
when the insured employees die, the banks receive the tax-free
death benefits.4 7 Each year, as the cash values of the life insurance
policies grow, the bank-beneficiaries account for these increases in
value on a tax-deferred basis on their income statements. 48 Banks
nominally tie these earnings to the post-retirement employee
benefits, for which they must now account. 49 This effectively
allows banks to net the inside build-up earnings against the future
liabilities and thus reduce some of the expense line from their
income statement altogether. ° With a new tax-free investment
alternative to municipal bonds that actually helped to solve their
future liabilities expense-reporting problem, banks turned to
BOLI in droves in the early 1990s."
Four additional benefits make investing in BOLI more
favorable than investing in municipal bonds.52 First, BOLI plans
can yield higher returns than municipal bonds.53 This is because
insurance companies invest in underlying assets such as corporate
bonds that fuel the inside build-up of the cash value of the
insurance policies. 4 Second, BOLI investments generally last

45. See Valued Employees, supra note 1.
46. Many Banks, supra note 1; see also Telephone Interview with Richard Mann,
supra note 2 (describing BOLI as such).
47. See APPLEMAN, supra note 15, at § 173.05(H).
48. Id.
49. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 2.
50. Id. Also, banks tied the investments to the post-retirement liabilities in order
to placate the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which oversees
banks with a national charter. Id.
51. See Big Banks, supra note 1 (discussing extent to which banks invested in
BOLI); Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
52. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
53. Bank Owned Life Insurance (BOLl), VA. BANKERS ASS'N, http://
(last visited
www.vabankers.org/EmployeeBenefits/Products/bank-ownedlife.htm
Nov. 13, 2006).
54. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 20; Telephone Interview with Richard Mann,
supra note 2. Although municipal bonds may have similar returns to the after-tax
returns corporate bonds yield, the fact that the underlying investment in the
corporate bond is made for the accrual of interest to pay an insurance death benefit
removes the tax consideration from the corporate bond return altogether and thus
results in a tax-free return of the corporate bond outpacing that of a municipal bond.
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much longer than the life of municipal bond investments. 55 While
municipal bonds might mature five, ten, or even twenty years after
their purchase, BOLI contracts do not mature until the death of
the insured employee, which in many cases can be as late as forty
or more years after the purchase date.56 Obviously, the longer
banks can profit from sound, tax-favored investments, the better.
Third, the death proceeds from BOLI plans tend to very closely
match the timing of employer health care costs, which seem to
increase sharply near the time of death. 7 Finally, BOLI plans are
somewhat insulated from the interest rate risk associated with
long-term, fixed-income investments. 58 This is due to insurance
companies' utilization of corporate bonds and other investments as
the source of the policies' inside build-up. 9 Instead of investing
only in long-term bonds, insurance companies typically invest in
relatively shorter-term debt instruments, perhaps with durations of
around five years. 6° Thus, even if interest rates in general were to
rise rapidly, the loss to the underlying corporate bonds' value
would be minimized due to their shorter average life spans.61 Once
those bonds mature, insurance companies can simply re-invest in
new bonds and take advantage of the potentially higher interest
rates. 62 In short, the insurance contracts' buffers allow banks to
have long-term investments with relatively low interest rate
movement risk.63

55. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 15 (stating that "[mlost BOLI products have
very long-term (30- to 40-year) expected time frames for full collection of cash
proceeds, i.e., the death benefit").
56. Id.; Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
57. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 45. (citing James D. Lubitz & Ronald Prihoda,
The Use and Costs of Medicare Services in the Last 2 Years of Life, HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 5 (Spring 1984)).
58. Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2. Described briefly,
"interest rate risk is the risk to earnings and capital arising from movements in
interest rates." OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 16. For example, a bank is exposed to
an interest rate risk when it invests in a long-term, fixed-rate bond. If interest rates
rise rapidly before the bond matures, the value of the bond decreases rapidly as
investors could yield higher returns by purchasing other bonds with similar risk
characteristics.
59. Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
60. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 16.
61. Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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The Evolution of BOLI

Although BOLI began as a fairly straightforward product,
it was not long until the market saw new variations of the product.
The first renditions of BOLI involved general-account life
insurance policies. 64 The term "general-account" refers to the fact
that the inside build-up increased at rates reflecting the returns
generated by a mix of investments in the carrier's general portfolio
and that the life insurance company guaranteed a certain floor
below which the cash value of the policy could not drop.65 Despite
this guaranteed floor, the bank policyholders were subject to the
credit risk of the carrier as general creditors. 66 These risks were
reduced, however, by the existence of states' guarantee funds,
which provided limited protection for• policyholders
of insurance
61
contracts in the event of a carrier's insolvency.
As tax planners became more sophisticated, new variablelife, separate account BOLI plans emerged which advertised either
higher yields or lower costs for banks. 68 For example, variable-life,
separate account BOLI plans, as the name implies, included a
variable rate of inside build-up based on the performance of
69
various investments in which the life insurance company invested.
In some cases, in order to feel secure in the soundness of these
underlying investments, the plan permitted banks to select among
the carrier's available investment options that would vary in terms

64. See id.
65. See OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 15.
66. See Anne L. Maxwell, Bank-Owned Life Insurance: Risks, Rewards, and
Other Considerations,SRC INSIGHTS (Fed. Reserve Bd. of Phila., Phila., P.A.), 1st
Quarter, 2004, available at http://www.phil.frb.org/src/srcinsights/srcinsights/
qlsi3_04.html.
67. Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2; State Guarantee
Funds, http://www.annuityadvantage.com/stateguarantee.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2006); What Happens When an Insurance Company Fails?, http://www.nolhga.com/
policyholderinfo/main.cfm/location/insolvencyprocess (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
This is analogous to the concept of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
insuring deposit accounts at banks.
68. Rick McCarter, Separate Account vs. General Account: What Kind of BOLI
Do You Buy?, BENMARK, INC., http://www.benmark.com/page.asp?pid=5406 (last
visited Nov. 28, 2006).
69. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 28; Telephone Interview with Richard Mann,
supra note 2.
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of risk and reward structures. 70 With these variable-life, separate
account BOLI plans, there was no guarantee from the insurer that
the cash value of the policies would not dip below a certain
amount. 7 ' As a result, because of banks' desire to develop stable
earnings from these products, they would buy "stable value
product" features in their plans. 7' These features effectively
smoothed out market value fluctuations of the underlying
investment to maintain stable, non-volatile, and reasonably
predictable earnings for the banks.73
Overall, BOLl is a quite sophisticated and complex product
that allows banks and other companies to receive tax-free (1) the
inside build-up on the life insurance policy and (2) the death
benefit when the insured employee dies.74 Because some might
find the practice of an employer benefiting from the death of its
employees suspect,75 it comes as no surprise that controversy
concerning •BOLI 76and COLI arose as the popularity of these
products increased.
III. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING BOLl

A.

JanitorsInsurance

In the spring of 2002, The Wall Street Journal began
attacking BOLl and COLI as being unethical in nature.77
Although banks were taking out insurance contracts on the lives of
their employees, not all BOLl purchasers were actually informing
70. McCarter, supra note 68.
71. See id.; OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 10; Telephone Interview with Richard
Mann, supra note 2.
72. Telephone Interview with Richard Mann, supra note 2.
73. Jon Fraade, Stable Value COLI/BOLI Products,STABLE TIMES (Stable Value
Inv. Ass'n, Wash., D.C.) 2d Quarter, 1999, available at http://www.stablevalue.org/
library/vol3issue2/part8.asp; see also OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 12 (describing a
"stable value protection contract" as "protect[ing] the policy owner from declines in
the value of the assets in the separate account arising from changes in interest rates,
thereby mitigating price risk and earnings volatility").
74. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
75. Valued Employees, supra note 1; Many Banks, supra note 1; Big Banks, supra
note 1.
76. See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
77. Valued Employees, supra note 1; Many Banks, supra note 1; Big Banks, supra
note 1.
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their employees of the coverage, sometimes contrary to state law.78
According to the press reports, this was largely due to the banks'
and other companies' realistic supposition that at least some
employees would object to BOLI and COLI.79

Once a few

employees learned that their employers, or in many cases, exemployers, would benefit from their deaths, they went to the press
seeking exposure.' ° The Wall Street Journal ran several articles
that criticized companies and banks for benefiting from their
employees' deaths, 8' describing the practice of investing in BOLI
or COLI as unfair and calling the type
of insurance "janitors
' '12
policies.
peasants
"dead
or
insurance"
While some of the BOLI and COLI plans described in the
articles did not seem particularly attractive, the articles failed to
mention that the cases described were not the typical BOLI and
COLI practices of the time. 3 In fact, many companies that took
out insurance coverage on their employees did so only with the
consent of the employee. 84 Further, The Wall Street Journalfailed
to mention that the purpose of most BOLI and COLI plans is to
fund pre- and post-retirement benefit obligations that employers
owe to their employees.8' Thus, even though certain employees
may not want their employers to profit from their deaths, the
death benefits help to fund pre- and post-retirement employee
benefits provided to the employees.86 Therefore, in aggregate
BOLI and COLI help both employers and employees.
Nevertheless, The Wall Street Journal'sunfavorable view of BOLI

and COLI likely influenced Congress to bring about the employer-

78. Big Banks, supra note 1.
79. Valued Employees, supra note 1.
80. See id.
81. Id.; Big Banks, supra note 1.
82. Valued Employees, supra note 1.
83. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 49-50 (arguing that the 2002 Wall Street Journal
articles mischaracterized COLI by giving as examples only the abusive practices).
84. Id.
85. Id. Even many of the companies abusing COLI were doing so only in order
to pay for the ever-increasing costs of employee benefits, which increase directly with
increasing medical costs. Id.
86. Id.
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owned life insurance reforms of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 discussed later in this Note.87
B.

Litigation SurroundingBOLl and COLI

Coincidental with the unfavorable press coverage, courts
found some older COLI plans for large corporations such as WinnDixie,8 Wal-Mart s9 and, more recently, Dow Chemical9° invalid
and thus not subject to favorable tax treatment. The two main
reasons for holding that the plans were impermissible were (1) that
the investing company lacked an insurable interest in some or all
of the insured employees, 9' and (2) that the COLI plans were
economic shams. 9' State law determines whether an entity has an
insurable interest in an insured, as the states are the primary
regulators of insurance companies and insurance contracts. 93 In
Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., the court stated that Wal-Mart
would have an insurable interest in its employees if it "possess[ed]
a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage from
the continued life of [its employees]." 94 The court further
explained this requirement by suggesting it would be satisfied if
Wal-Mart would be in a better economic position if its employee
lived rather than died. 95 Wal-Mart was determined to lack an
insurable interest in the 350,000 employees it had covered in its

87. See infra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
88. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
89. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 794 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
90. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006).
91. See, e.g., Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d 794.
92. See, e.g., Dow, 435 F.3d 594; Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d
737 (6th Cir. 2003); In re CM Holdings, 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002). Described briefly,
an economic sham is a transaction that has no "practicable economic effects other
than the creation of income tax losses." Dow, 435 F.3d at 599 (citing Rose v. Comm'r,
868 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1989)).
93. See Adney et al., supra note 5, at 46 (noting that states vary considerably as to
what constitutes an insurable interest in an employee).
94. Mayo, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (quoting Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., 161 S.W.2d 1057, 1058-59 (1942)).
95. See id. at 799. There is a "key man" exception to this rule where a company
has an insurable interest in the lives of particular persons to whom stockholders look
for the overall success of a business. Id. at n.11.
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COLI plan and, thus, the proceeds from the insurance contracts
were distributed to the insured employees' estates.96
In contrast to insurable interest, federal law governs what
constitutes economic shams for purposes of claiming favorable
97
federal income tax treatment. Much more litigation centered on
the economic sham argument, which resulted in large tax liabilities
for companies abusing COLI in this manner.98 The type of COLI
that courts found to be economic shams was called "leveraged".
COLI. 99 The companies that owned leveraged COLI borrowed
against the cash values in the policies in order to pay for the
premiums.'0° It was this borrowing of all cash values in the policies
coupled with interest deductions claimed for such borrowing that
led to the "sham" conclusions. 1
However, Congress added
interest deduction rules to the tax code in 1996 and 1997 that shut
down this "leveraged" product.' °2 Therefore, companies no longer
use this abusive type of COLI. 0 3
BOLI is not subject to the same economic sham arguments
that the government used to defeat the older "leveraged" COLI
plans because banks generally do not borrow against the policies
in order to fund premium payments.' °4 Nevertheless, while the
holdings from the economic sham cases do not affect banks
directly because they have purchased plans that do not exhibit the
same characteristics that courts found abusive in the leveraged
COLI cases, the negative perception of COLI that such cases
precipitated may still injure the reputation of banks that
appropriately hold non-abusive BOL 0
96. Id. at 808-09; Adney et al., supra note 5, at 47.
97. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 51.
98. See David M. Katz, The COLI wars, CFO MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2001,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/2991260?f=search (commenting that as of 2001 the
Internal Revenue Service had identified eighty-five taxpayers with plans similar to
those in Winn-Dixie and In re CM Holdings).
99. Id.
100. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 51; Telephone Interview with Richard Mann,
supra note 2.
101. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 51.
102. Id. at 51-52; Katz, supra note 98.
103. Adney et al., supra note 5, at 51-52.
104. Bank Owned Life Insurance, AM. BANKERS ASS'N, May 25, 2001,
www.meyerchatfield.com/education/ABAwhitepaper.pdf.
105. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 14.
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Mitigating Controversy by Following Interagency Guidance

Banks are highly regulated institutions.
Since December
2004, they have also had the benefit of an interagency statement
on the purchase and risk management of BOLI (the Guidance)
issued by the federal banking regulators, which supersedes the
previous guidelines of OCC Bulletin 2000-23.'0' The Guidance sets
forth guidelines that banks must follow when determining whether
to purchase BOLI and when assessing risk while they hold BOLI
plans °8 Before purchasing BOLI, banks must undergo an
intensive "pre-purchase analysis" of the product. 09 Along with
other considerations, the analysis should include matching the
need for insurance with the appropriate type of BOLI product,
determining the appropriate amount of insurance needed,
"assessing vendor qualifications," and evaluating alternative
investments that might meet the bank's needs. 1
The Guidance
also requires banks to perform ongoing risk evaluations while they
hold BOLI plans. "1 The OCC determined that banks must
consider several categories of risks to which BOLI might expose
them, including "Tax and Insurable Interest Implications" and
"Reputation Risk.'. 2 The Guidance emphasizes the importance
of favorable tax treatment to the profitability of BOLI plans and
warns that either "investor control" or the lack of an insurable
interest would result in the loss of such treatment. "3 Investor

106. See generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF
ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d. ed. 2006)
(describing the complex regulatory structure in which banks operate).
107. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 1. The Guidance was issued by the "[OCC],
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)." Id.;
Regulatory Alert on BOLl Guidance, Clark Consulting, Dec. 10, 2004,
http://www.clarkconsulting.com/knowledgecenter/articlesfbanking/bulletin2004l2lO.p
df (available via free subscription).
108. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 1.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 6-10.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 11-19. "Reputation Risk" is a new category of risk that was not present
in OCC Bulletin 2000-23 and was likely included in the Guidance on account of the
negative publicity and litigation surrounding COLI and BOLl. Regulatory Alert on
BOLl Guidance, supra note 107.
113. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 13-14.
BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE
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control is only an issue with separate account, variable BOLI
products, and thus banks purchasing separate account BOLI plans
should pay close attention to tax laws concerning investor
control. 14 Banks should also obtain legal counsel in order to
comply with state insurable interest laws, as compliance with the
Therefore, although the
Guidance may not fulfill them.'
guidelines set forth in the Guidance help banks avoid supervisory
action, banks must still consider tax laws and insurable interest
laws in order to avoid the abuses at issue in the previously
mentioned cases."16
Banks must also assess the reputation risk that these cases
may carry for them."7 As publications like The Wall Street Journal
have characterized all BOLI and COLI plans as largely the same,""
customers and employees may regard BOLI as improper or unfair.
Consequently, banks should encourage positive press concerning
the way that they properly invest in BOLI and their purpose for
doing so. The approach suggested by the Guidance is to obtain
formal employee consent before insuring his life." 9 Employee
consent would likely decrease lawsuits as well as mitigate the
unfavorable perception of BOLI described in The Wall Street
In addition, such consent is now required
Journal articles.2
pursuant to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, discussed next.
IV. THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006
In response to the controversy surrounding BOLl and
COLI, Congress enacted section 863 of the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 (the Act), 2' which President Bush signed into law on

114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. The Guidance asserts that "[c]ompliance with the supervisory guidance in
this interagency statement ... does not determine whether the policy satisfies state
insurable interest requirements." Id. at 1.
116. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
117. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 14.
118. See Adney et al., supra note 5, at 49-50.
119. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 14.
120. See Valued Employees, supra note 1; Many Banks, supra note 1; Big Banks,
supra note 1.
121. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 863, 120 Stat. 780,
1021-24 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 101(j), 60391) (LEXIS through 2006 Sess.).
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August 17, 2006. Section 863 of the Act adds section 1010) to the
Internal Revenue Code, which creates a broad rule that prevents
employers from excluding from taxable income any death benefits
that result from an insurance policy under which an employee of
the employer is an insured. 12 ' The result of this rule, if there were
no exceptions, would be that employers owning BOLI or COLI
policies2 could no longer enjoy the tax benefits that normally
accompany such policies. Fortunately, section 1010) carves out
several exceptions that permit the tax-free benefits resulting from
policies insuring particular employees.'5
Under section 101(j)(2)(A), an employer may exclude
proceeds from a life insurance contract it owns on its employee if
any time during the year prior to the employee's death the insured
was an employee, or if, at the time the contract is issued, the
employee was (1) a "director," (2) a "highly compensated
employee," or (3) a "highly compensated individual., 126 Both
"highly compensated employee" and "highly compensated
individual" have specific statutory definitions,12 7 but they generally
refer to employees who are either compensated over $100,000
(adjusted for inflation) or are among the thirty-five percent most
highly paid employees.1 2 The latter exceptions to the general
exclusion disallowance rule acknowledge the long-accepted
practice of insuring "key persons" - those employees, such as
directors and other important employees, that have such an impact

122. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to sections are to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code).
123. I.R.C. § 1010)(1) (LEXIS through 2006 Sess.).
124. Although § 1010) refers specifically to an "employer-owned insurance
contract," its definition under § 101(j)(3)(A) is such that it may be equated with
BOLI and COLI for the purposes of this Note.
125. § 101(j)(2)(A). There are also exceptions to the general rule based on
amounts paid to an insured's heirs under an employer-owned life insurance contract.
§ 101(j)(2)(B).
126. § 101(j)(2)(A).
127. For "highly compensated employee," see I.R.C. § 414(q) (2006) (generally
describing a highly compensated employee to be a 5% owner or an employee who
made over $80,000 in the previous year). For "highly compensated individual," see §
105(h)(5) (2006) (describing a highly compensated individual to be one of the five
highest paid officers, a shareholder owning more than 10% of the company's stock,
or among the 25% most highly paid employees in that taxable year (which is adjusted
upward to thirty-five percent by § 1010j)(2)(A)(ii)(III))).
128. See §§ 105(h)(5), 414(q).
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on their employer's day-to-day activities that their deaths should
be insured against in order to mitigate losses. 29 In doing so, the
provisions essentially limit COLI and BOLI tax benefits to plans
that follow this "key person" formula, thus mitigating the
perceived abuse of insuring the lives of low-level employees - the
prototypical janitors - in whom the employers may not have
insurable interests anyway.130

In addition to limiting the types of employees that
employers can insure, section 101(j) also imposes "notice and
consent requirements" that employers must meet in order for any
benefit from BOLI or COLI to be excluded from taxable
income. 131 In order to benefit from the tax advantages of BOLI or
COLI, banks or other companies must take care that, before the
life insurance contracts are issued, an employee:

(1) is notified in writing that the applicable
policyholder intends to insure the employee's life
and the maximum face amount for which the
employee could be insured at the time the contract
was issued; (2) provides written consent to being
insured under the contract and that such coverage
may continue after the insured terminates

employment; and (3) is informed in writing that an
applicable policyholder will be a beneficiary of any
proceeds payable upon the death of the employee. 112
The employer must also report on BOLI and COLI annually to
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and meet certain internal
recordkeeping requirements related to the policies.'33

129. See Adney et al., supra note 5, at 43.
130. See supra notes 91, 93-96 and accompanying text.
131. I.R.C. § 1010)(4) (LEXIS through 2006 Sess.).
132. Id. The term "applicable policyholder" refers to the bank or other company
that owns the life insurance contract. § 101(j)(3)(B).
133. § 60391. Briefly, section 60391 requires that any employer owning one or
more employer-owned life insurance contract must report to the IRS (1) the number
of its employees at the end of the year, (2) the number of those employees who are
insured, (3) the total amount of insurance on those employees, (4) its "name, address,
and taxpayer identification number" and its "type of business," and (5) evidence that
consent has been given on each insurance contract. Id. Further, any such employer
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The Act only applies to BOLI or COLI contracts issued
' allows all
after August 17, 2006.134 This "grandfather clause" 35
BOLI and COLI contracts issued before the enactment of the Act
to be exempt from its rules.136 Second, section 863 of the Act
provides that the Act will not apply to a life insurance contract
issued pursuant to section 1035 in exchange for a life insurance
contract issued prior to August 17, 2006.137 The result of a "1035

exchange" is that policyholders may exchange an insurance policy
insuring a particular person for a different insurance contract
insuring the same person. 138 Pursuant to section 1035, there is no
recognition of gain or loss with such an exchange and thus there is
no taxable event.1 39 Section 863 of the Act goes on to state that
''any material increase in the death benefit or other material
' 4°
change shall cause the contract to be treated as a new contract.
Thus, the IRS will treat any 1035 exchange that includes a
"material change" in the life insurance contract as a new contract
141
subject to section 101(j).

must keep sufficient records to show that these requirements and those set forth in
section 101(j) are satisfied. Id.
134. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 863(d), 120 Stat. 780,
1024 (2006). The Act and limitations and requirements thereunder "apply to life
insurance contracts issued after the date of the enactment of [the] Act, except for a
contract issued after such date pursuant to an exchange described in section 1035 of
[the Code] for a contract issued on or prior to that date." Id.
135. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 718 (8th ed. 2004) (defining grandfather
clause as "[a] provision that creates an exemption from the law's effect for something
that existed before the law's effective date").
136. See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 863(d).
137. Id.
138. I.R.C. § 1035 (2006).
139. Id.
140. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 863(d). There is an exception in the clause,
but it is beyond the scope of this Note.
141. Id. The Supreme Court has held that properties "are 'different' in the sense
that is 'material' to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors
enjoy legal entitlements that are different in kind or extent." Cottage Sav. Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 565 (1991). Thus, any difference between insurance policies
involved in an exchange will result in the new contract as being subject to section
101(j) if such differences alter the legal entitlements of the parties in a manner
described by the Court in Cottage Savings.
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V. BOLl IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE

The Act certainly restricts BOLI plans, as it removes the
favorable tax treatment of such plans insuring employees outside
42
of the statutory limits, regardless of state insurable interest laws.
Thus, to the extent that they were insuring employees outside of
the new limits, banks may reduce the number of employees
covered by BOLI going forward. Because pre-existing BOLl
plans have been "grandfathered,"' 143 banks may continue to benefit
from broader-based BOLl plans that insure hundreds, possibly
thousands, of their employees.' 44 Nevertheless, banks should be
cautious of the 1035 exchange and material change language
contained in the Act.4 If new BOLl investments are made for
new employees or to fund ever-increasing pre- and post-retirement
employee benefits, banks must be sure to comply with the new
notice, consent, 46reporting, and recordkeeping requirements set
forth by the Act.
Further, even though controversy that may expose
investing banks to reputation risks still surrounds BOLI, 147 banks
should continue to invest in BOLl while encouraging and
contributing accurate press about the issue. One or two positive
articles in major publications discussing the new requirements
under the Act and the reputable practices complying entities
undergo with regard to BOLl may help the public begin to view
the issue in a more favorable light. If a discourse couples the
requirements of the Act with an in-depth discussion of the benefits
that BOLl provides to bank employees, the public may even
encourage the practice. At the very least, informed employees
should be much more willing to give their consent to an investment
described as above.

142. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
144. As BOLl investments have relatively long terms, it can be expected that
those banks that invested in BOLl previously will continue to benefit similarly as
they have in the past for possibly the next thirty to forty years. See supra notes 53-54
and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
147. OCC 2004-56, supra note 5, at 14.
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VI. CONCLUSION

BOLI is a sophisticated financial product that allows banks
to fund their pre- and post-retirement employee benefit
obligations.1 4 Banks have been able to use BOLl by employing
some of the investment properties of life insurance in general and
the favorable tax treatment thereof. 149 Although the potential for
investing in life insurance long preceded the widespread use of
BOLl, certain developments in financial accounting standards and
tax treatment reform of municipal bonds spurred entrepreneurs to
create this complicated and lucrative vehicle.150 Through its use,
banks and marketers alike became more familiar with the
mechanisms of BOLl and began to expand the original idea of a
general account model, thus resulting in large numbers of banks
investing in BOLl. 15 '
Due to the widespread use of BOLl and COLI, as well as
abuses of the products, publications such as The Wall Street
Journal brought the issue to the attention of the public, coining
terms such as "janitors insurance" to describe company-owned
possible.1 2
as
employees
many
as
on
insurance
Contemporaneously, several cases involving BOLl and COLI
were litigated in state and federal courts. 5 3 In holding that the
plans were economic shams or otherwise that the employer lacked
an insurable interest in the employee, the courts added to the
controversy surrounding the subject. 1144 Most banks, however, were
able to avoid litigation by following guidelines set forth in OCC
Bulletin 2000-23 and later OCC Bulletin 2004-56.115 In response to
the controversy, and in an effort to curb abuses, Congress added
section 863 to the Pension Protection Act of 2006.156 This
'

148. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
156. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 863, 120 Stat. 780,
1021-24 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 101(j), 60391) (LEXIS through 2006 Sess.).
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legislation will likely be highly effective in curbing BOLI and
COLI abuses going forward."'
Even though controversy has surrounded BOLI, banks
should continue to use it to fund their pre- and post-retirement
employee
benefit
obligations
while
promoting
greater
understanding of the product. BOLI benefits both banks and their
employees by providing a unique deferred-tax investment that
banks use to fund pre- and post-retirement benefits. 58 By utilizing
BOLI as an effective investment strategy, banks should be more
willing to offer their employees more and better benefits that
might not otherwise be feasible.5 9
As such, this valuable
investment tool should not be discarded because of negative press
due to previous abuses of BOLI and COLI.' 60 Banks should
continue to use BOLI to fund their pre- and post-retirement
benefit obligations, but they should also be sure to pay close
attention to the Act16 and to understand that they may need to
implement public relations strategies to inform the public that
BOLI benefits the insured employees by allowing for superior
employee benefits. 62
JOEL W. MANN

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

124-33 and accompanying text.
14-27 and accompanying text.
47-53 and accompanying text.
88-101 and accompanying text.
121-41 and accompanying text.
117-20 and accompanying text.
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